In a multitime hybrid differential game with mechanical work payoff, the multitime upper value function and the multitime lower value function are viscosity solutions of original PDEs of type HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs.
Multitime lower or upper value function
All variables and functions must satisfy suitable conditions (for example, see [8] ). We analyze a multitime hybrid differential game, with two teams of players, whose Bolza payoff is the sum between a path independent curvilinear integral (mechanical work) and a function of the final event (the terminal cost, penalty term) and whose evolution PDE is an m-flow. The optimal control problem is:
Find To simplify, suppose that the curve Γ 0T is an increasing curve in the multitime interval Ω 0T .
We vary the starting multitime and the initial point. We obtain a larger family of similar multitime problems containing the functional
and the evolution constraint (Cauchy problem for first order PDEs system)
Definition 1.1. Let Ψ and Φ be suitable strategies of the two equips of players.
(i) The function
is called the multitime lower value function.
(ii) The function
is called the multitime upper value function.
The papers [1] - [4] , [12] refer to viscosity solutions of Hamilton-JacobiIsaacs equations. To understand the multitime optimal control and our recent results see the papers [5] - [11] .
Viscosity solutions of multitime upper/lower PDEs
The key original idea is that the multitime upper value function or the multitime lower value function are solutions of PDEs, defined in the next Theorem. Our PDEs contain some implicit assumptions and are valid under certain conditions which are defined and analyzed for multitime hybrid differential games. 
which satisfies the terminal condition M(T, x) = g(x).
(ii) The multitime lower value function m(t, x) is the viscosity solution of the multitime lower PDE
which satisfies the terminal condition m(T, x) = g(x).
Proof. We introduce the so-called upper and lower Hamiltonian defined respectively by
We prove only the first statement. For s ∈ Ω tt+h , we use the Cauchy problem ∂x
and the cost functional (mechanical work)
For s ∈ Ω tT \ Ω tt+h , the cost is M(t + h, x(t + h)). Consequently,
is the greatest cost. Thus we have the multitime dynamic programming optimality condition
Let (ω) ∈ C 1 (Ω 0T × R n ) be a generating vector field. We analyse two cases:
Case 1 Suppose M − ω attains a local maximum at (t, x) ∈ Ω 0T × R n . We must prove the inequality
For that, we suppose the contrary
for each α = 1, m and for some constant 1-form θ α > 0. Let h = (h α ), with h α > 0. We use the Fundamental Lemma in the next Section. This implies that, for each sufficiently small h and all ω ∈ A(t), the relation
with x(·) solution of the previous Cauchy problem. Because M − ω has a local maximum at the point (t, x), we have
The multitime dynamic programming optimality condition and by the local maximum definition, we can write
Consequently, we have max
(3) On the other hand,
So, the relation (3) contradicts the relation (2).
Case 2 Suppose M − ω attains a local minimum at (t, x) ∈ Ω 0T × R n . We must prove that
.
To do this, we suppose the contrary
Because M − ω has a local minimum at the point (t, x), we have
where x(·) is the solution of the previous Cauchy problem. By the multitime dynamic programming optimality condition and by the local minimum definition, we can write
Using the inequality
(6) On the other hand,
That is why the relation (6) contradicts the relation (5).
Fundamental contradict Lemma
The short proofs in the previous section are based on an interesting Lemma.
then, for all vectors h = (h α ), with sufficiently small ||h||, there exists a control v = (v α ) ∈ V(t 0 ) such that the relation (2) holds for all strategies Φ ∈ A(t 0 ).
(ii) If M − ω attains a local minimum at (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ Ω 0T × R n and
then, for all vectors h = (h α ), with sufficiently small ||h||, there exists a control u = (u α ) ∈ U(t 0 ) such that the relation (5) holds for all strategies Ψ ∈ B(t 0 ).
Proof. We introduce the 1-form Λ of components
Consequently there exists some control v * ∈ V such that
On the other hand, the uniform continuity of the 1-form
provided s ∈ Ω t 0 t 0 +h , for any small ||h|| > 0, and x(·) is solution of PDE on Ω t 0 t 0 +h , for any u(·), v(·), with initial condition x(t 0 ) = x 0 . It follows that, for the control v(·) = v * and for any strategy Φ ∈ A(t 0 ), we have
−θ α 2 for s ∈ Ω t 0 t 0 +h . Taking the curvilinear integral along an increasing curve Γ t 0 t 0 +h , we obtain the relation (2).
(ii) The inequality in the Lemma reads
The uniform continuity of the 1-form Λ implies
Due to compactness of V, there exists finitely many distinct points v 1 , ..., v n ∈ V; u 1 , ..., u n ∈ U and the numbers r 1 , ..., r n > 0 such that V ⊂ B(u i , r i ), k = 1, n.
In this way,
Again, the uniform continuity of the 1-form Λ and a sufficiently small ||h|| > 0 give Λ α (s, x(s), ψ(v α ), v α ) ≥ 1 2 θ α , ∀v ∈ V, s ∈ Ω t 0 t 0 +h , and any solution x(·) of PDE on Ω t 0 t 0 +h , for any u(·), v(·) and with initial condition x(t 0 ) = x 0 . Now define a new strategy Ψ ∈ B(t 0 ), Ψ[v α ](s) = ψ(v α (s)), ∀v ∈ V(t 0 ), s ∈ Ω t 0 t 0 +h .
Finally, for each α, we have the inequality
and taking the curvilinear integral along an increasing curve Γ t 0 t 0 +h , we find the result in Lemma.
